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This paper examines the development implications of Chinese 
investment in the Sudan to enable a better understanding of the 
impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) from developing countries. 
By examining China’s early investment in the Sudan by the Chinese 
National Oil Corporation (CNPC) and the consequent cascade effect 
on the Sudan’s significant economic growth during the decade between 
1997 and 2007, this paper highlights how progress was achieved through 
interaction between Chinese FDI and host institutions. It demonstrates 
that developing country FDI can make positive contributions to 
development particularly in developing countries, due not only to its 
capacity appropriate for developing countries, but also to its strategies 
and mindset more adaptable to the development needs and institutional 
environment in the host country. While extant research often emphasizes 
how institutions make FDI’s impact on host countries differ and how 
institutions in developing countries should be improved in order to 
attract FDI, this research indicates that proactive adaptation of strategy 
by transnational corporations (TNCs) to fit local needs and institutions 
may be more effective for improving institutions and consequently the 
development in host countries.
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1.  Introduction 
Africa, as home to 300 million of the globe’s poorest people, presents 
the world’s most formidable challenge for development. Traditional policies 
to promote development, such as aid and trade, are considered unsuccessful 
(Birdsall et al., 2003; Easterly, 2009), while foreign direct investment 
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(FDI) from developed countries had been stagnant for decades up to 
2005 (UNCTAD, 2007). However, the recent dramatic rise of FDI from 
developing countries has brought both hope and concern for Africa’s 
development. FDI inflows to Africa rose from $29 billion in 2005 to $36 
billion in 2006, and to $53 billion in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2008).1 Despite 
the current financial crisis, inflows to Africa increased by 27% in 2008, 
to another record high of $88 billion (UNCTAD, 2009, p. 42). Inflows 
did show a decline in 2009 to $59 billion, but it was believed that the 
decline was comparatively “moderate” and this was because that 
“new investors provided a buffer” (UNCTAD, 2010). Many of these new 
investors are from developing countries. 
The driving force behind this recovery was primarily the boom in 
the global commodity markets, which led to large FDI inflows into the 
primary sector (UNCTAD, 2006, 2007). China has substantially increased 
its investment into Africa at a drastic pace. Its annual investment flows 
into Africa were only $20 million in 1997 and $75 million in 2003, but rose 
to $317 million in 2004, $392 million in 2005, $520 million in 2006, and 
then more dramatically rose to $1,574 million in 2007, $5,491 million 
in 2008 and $9,107 million in 2009 according to the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce (MOC, 2007, 2009, 2010a).2 A World Bank source, on the 
other hand, estimates that the figure was less than $1 billion per year 
before 2004 and over $7 billion per year after 2006 (Foster et al., 2008). 
If this estimate is accurate, China may account for well above 10% of 
total FDI Africa received in the period between 2000 and 2008. 
China’s investment relationship with Africa is often described 
as “dominated by extractive activities” (Jenkins and Edwards, 2006, p. 
16). However, this claim does not reflect the whole picture of China-
Africa relationship. Trade between China and Africa doubled to $18.5 
billion from 2002 to 2003,, then jumped to $73 billion in 2007, and 
$106.84 billion in 2008, all record highs (MOC, 2010b). In 2009 with the 
background of global financial crisis, trade between China and Africa 
was still as high as $91.07 billion. More importantly, China became the 
largest trading partner of Africa for the first time, ahead the United 
States, France and the United Kingdom (MOC, 2010a). Detailed data 
show that in 2008, Africa’s exports to China reached $50.84 billion, of 
1   The $ sign refers to the US dollar in this paper.
2  This annual figure obviously excluded the Chinese investment in oil, because 
CNPC alone invested over $5 billion in Sudan by 2006 (CNPC, 2006).
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which 71% were crude oil; Africa’s imports from China hit $56 billion, of 
which most were textile and clothes, machinery, transport equipment 
base metals and footwear.3 These data indicate that the surge of trade 
between China and Africa was driven by not only China’s increased 
imports of African oil but also Africa’s rising demand for Chinese 
goods. 
China is also deeply involved in Africa’s infrastructure 
construction. The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) estimated 
that $42.1 billion was committed by bilateral, multilateral and private 
sector sources for African infrastructure in 2007. Chinese commitments 
equalled $4.5 billion while G-8 members of the ICA collectively 
committed $3.5 billion (DFID, 2008). 
At the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2006, President 
Hu Jintao announced China’s commitments to Africa, including the 
doubling of aid by 2009; providing concessionary credits of $3 billion; 
establishing a $2 billion fund to support Chinese investment in Africa; 
cancelling $1.3 billion debt due in 2005 for low-income countries; 
and expanding market access to African products (Hu, 2006). Since 
2007, China has become a donor to the World Bank’s International 
Development Association with a contribution of $30 million in 2007. 
China has increased its contribution to the African Development Bank 
to $120 million – its largest ever contribution. 
This paper attempts to analyse the development impact of 
Chinese FDI in the Sudan from a perspective of developing country FDI 
located in developing countries. The focus will be on two considerations 
concerning China’s FDI in Africa. One is that China’s FDI in Africa 
relates to an important issue deserving much more research, namely 
developing country FDI located in developing countries. FDI from 
developing countries has risen rapidly over the past two decades4, 
and is considered to have particularly important implications for 
3   “China Africa trade up 45% in 2008 to $107 billion”, China Daily, 11 February 
2009. Also Brown and Zhang (2009).
4   FDI outflows from, and inflows to, developing countries set new records in 
2007 of $253 billion and $500 billion respectively (UNCTAD, 2008). More importantly, 
global FDI flows from and to developed countries have been severely affected worldwide 
by the current financial crisis. However, FDI outflows from and inflows to, developing 
countries kept growing in 2008 although they have been slowing down since 2009 
(UNCTAD, 2009).
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host developing countries (UNCTAD, 2006), but there is not sufficient 
empirical research to demonstrate such implications. 
Another consideration is that China’s FDI in Africa may have 
particular implications for development. FDI is generally perceived to 
have more direct impacts on development than trade and aid, because 
FDI brings not only direct but also indirect impacts on host countries. 
Moreover, FDI in resource-rich countries is particularly controversial 
for its implication for development. Rich natural resources could bring 
development, as evidenced by both developed countries, such as 
Australia and Canada, and developing countries, such as Botswana, 
Brazil and Chile. At the same time, resource booms may also become 
a curse (e.g. Karl, 2007; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Pearce, 2005). In the 
case of Chinese resource-seeking FDI in Africa, a controversy has arisen 
as to whether China is engaging in a new colonialism in Africa, through 
which resources will be extracted but poverty left unchanged, or even 
worsened (Broadman, 2007). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides an overview of the current research on the impact of FDI – 
particularly FDI from developing countries – on development. Section 3 
sets out the research questions and methods. Section four demonstrates 
how Chinese investment and host institutions interact, and how they 
together impact on the Sudan’s economy and society. Section five 
discusses development implications of Chinese FDI in the Sudan. Since 
econometric testing has not been possible at this stage, this paper 
concludes with some propositions for future empirical research.
2.  Developing country FDI in developing countries: 
implications for development
How to promote development has been a long-running research 
concern for scholars across disciplines including international business 
research. The key development issue concerning international 
business scholars might be how FDI benefits the social and economic 
development of host countries. 
The eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1980) postulates that a firm 
internationalizes only when three inter-related advantages in ownership 
(O), location (L) and internalization (I) are present. TNCs are often 
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considered as the transferors of a bundle of resources and competences, 
including financial capital, technology, managerial and organizational 
capabilities and marketing skills, i.e. traditional asset-based ownership 
advantages (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). A firm internationalizes to 
exploit such ownership advantages if L and I advantages also exist. 
From this perspective, transnational corporations (TNCs) expand their 
operations overseas for their own interests but could make various 
direct and indirect contributions to the host countries, given their 
superior ownership advantages or capabilities over local firms. Direct 
impacts include those on the structure of trade and the balance 
of payments, on technology transfer, on local market structure, on 
the level of employment and human resource development, and on 
average labour productivity and wages. In addition, there are indirect 
impacts which affect local firms in the host economy. These effects may 
be transmitted through linkages with TNCs, or increased competition 
and knowledge spillovers to the local economy (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008, p. 551).
TNCs’ potential positive contributions may include the following. 
First, when investing in host countries, TNCs generate income and 
tax revenues for the host country. Second, TNCs may also establish 
backward and forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958), through which 
transfer of technology to local firms may take place. Third, TNCs may 
interact with the local economy through hiring workers and providing 
training, generating income and contributing to skills development. 
Fourth, the affiliates might have spillover effects, e.g. through the 
impact of competition that might spur local firms to improve their 
performance (UNCTAD, 2007). 
However, TNCs’ investment – even with their superior capacity 
– does not always result in generating positive impacts stated above. 
In fact, TNCs have been criticized for failing to enhance local firms’ 
capability; using technology that is not always appropriate for local 
circumstances; creating merely low-wage jobs; and (ab)using their 
powerful political and economic position in host countries (Kolk et al., 
2006). 
Interestingly, while developing country TNCs are often thought 
to possess less ownership advantages than developed country TNCs 
(Mathews, 2006), they are believed to have particular implications 
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for host developing countries (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; 
UNCTAD, 2006; Yeung, 1994). First, their investment is located more 
in developing countries than in developed countries; over the years, 
South-South FDI has been increasing significantly in value. Second, 
it accounts for a larger share of inward FDI in developing countries, 
especially least developed countries. Third, the motivations, locational 
advantages sought, and ownership specific advantages of developing-
country TNCs differ in several respects from those of TNCs from 
developed countries (UNCTAD, 2006) and therefore may also generate 
different development impacts. Following this trend to identify the 
difference between TNCs from developed and developing countries, 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) provide an empirical analysis to argue 
that developing country TNCs tend to be less competitive than their 
developed country counterparts, partly because they suffer from the 
disadvantage of operating in home countries with underdeveloped 
institutions. However, this disadvantage can turn out to be an 
advantage when they operate in countries with “difficult” governance 
conditions, because developing country TNCs are used to operating in 
such institutional conditions. 
Based on their latest empirical research, Luo and Rui (2009) 
provide a new conceptual framework of “ambidexterity” to argue why 
and how TNCs from developing countries or emerging markets have 
stronger motives and abilities than their counterparts from developed 
countries to build and leverage ambidexterity to offset their late-
mover disadvantages. They behave co-evolutionarily to deal with 
the more challenging external environment they face at home and 
abroad, leverage their co-competence (transactional and relational) to 
compete against their global rivals, develop co-opetitive (simultaneous 
cooperation and competition) ties with their business stakeholders, and 
maintain co-orientations (leveraging competitive advantages to bolster 
short-term survival and compensating competitive disadvantages for 
long-term growth). While the major external environment determining 
developing country TNCs’ ambidexterity is the context of much 
intense competition and close network in global business, the internal 
environment is believed to be the more adaptive  goals, strategies 
and mindset of developing country TNCs towards host countries. The 
latter are considered important factors determining the impact of FDI 
on development (Yamin and Sinkovics, 2009). In line with the findings 
of Luo and Rui (2009), Prahalad (2010) provides examples of the ways 
54          Transnational Corporations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 2010)
in which TNCs can adapt their processes and technologies to local 
conditions, thereby unleashing potential entrepreneurial incentives 
in local managers and bringing positive effects on development in 
countries like China and India. The crucial factor to make this happen, 
according to Prahalad (2010), is that TNCs needs to have the mindset 
of “serving the poor”. 
The implication from international business literature is clear. 
FDI, including resource-seeking FDI and investment originating from 
developing countries, has potential to promote development, but this 
depends not only on TNCs’ capacity but also on their goals, strategies 
and mindset and whether they fit with the host country needs and 
appropriate for the host country’s institutional arrangement. The 
question is how to achieve such a fit. Section 4 addresses this question 
by exploring the case of Chinese investment in the Sudan.
3.  Research questions and methodology 
The Sudan, territorially the largest country in Africa, has been 
selected as a case study for several reasons. First, the Sudan is the 
largest recipient of cumulative FDI from China in Africa by taking the 
oil investment into account. Second, Chinese FDI in the Sudan has 
been initiated and still dominated by oil investment. Third, the Sudan 
is a typical least developed country in Africa, combining advantages 
and disadvantages shared by sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Research 
findings from the Sudan could provide many lessons for the rest of 
Africa. The following questions formed the core of the research project 
on Chinese FDI in the Sudan:
 What are the basic patterns and features of Chinese FDI in the 1. 
Sudan? 
 What are the strategies, capabilities, and contributions of the 2. 
Chinese TNCs in the Sudan? 
 What are the important factors, apart from natural resources, that 3. 
attract Chinese FDI to the Sudan? 
 Has the government created a sovereign wealth fund, as a step 4. 
towards avoiding a “resource curse”? 
What are the development implications for the Sudan from Chinese 5. 
FDI?
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As neither Chinese nor Sudanese authorities were able to 
provide the full range of archival data and information required for 
this research, we found fieldwork and interviews more suitable. Over 
a hundred interviews were conducted during four overseas field trips 
from 2005 to 2009, including three to Beijing focusing on the strategies 
and perceptions of Chinese firms on their investment in Africa, and 
one in the Sudan, focusing on local institutional environment and 
development implications from FDI. Follow-up interviews were carried 
out in 2009 and again in May 2010 through emails and phone calls. 
Interviewees in both countries included government officials, industrial 
experts, executives and site mangers of the Chinese TNCs under study 
and their affiliates in the Sudan. The views of NGOs, local firms linked to 
Chinese firms, and local residents in the Sudan were also sought. 
Given the sensitivity of the research topic, all interviewees 
were promised anonymity unless they were willing to be named. Key 
interviewees include the chief executive of Chinese National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) Nile Ltd in the Sudan, who was also the General 
Manager of GNPOC – the largest oil consortium in the Sudan; the chief 
executive of Khartoum Refinery; a dozen middle level managers among 
CNPC’s affiliates in the Sudan; Mr Ali Yousif Ahmed, senior official of 
the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former Sudanese 
Ambassador to China from 1993 to 1998; Mr. Hao Hongshe, Commercial 
Consul of the Chinese Embassy in Khartoum, and former official at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China who dealt with Sudanese relations 
in 1990s; head of the Africa Bureau at China’s Export and Import Bank; 
five officials at the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Investment, and 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals in the Sudan; a few NGO staff members 
at the Sudan Working Group, and two academics who research the 
Sudan’s history and Darfur in particular. This paper was based on the 
information and views collected from all of these sources as well as 
other anonymous interviewees. 
We also collected archival data from government departments 
of Sudan, including the Ministry of Investment, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral, and the Bank of Sudan, which 
are especially valuable because most of the data are in Arabic and 
not publicly available. Corporate annual reports, speeches by CEOs, 
published books and journal papers were also carefully studied. This 
paper is based on all these data as background but takes the CNPC as 
the case study.
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4.  Chinese FDI and cascade effect in the Sudan: 
major findings
The analysis in this section is based on the examination of the 
cascade effect on the Sudan’s economy during the decade 1997–2007. 
In this paper, a cascade effect refers to the phenomenon that the initial 
Chinese investment in the Sudan’s oil industry brought the direct effect 
of large revenues and the indirect effect of industrial linkages. The 
subsequent re-investment of the oil revenue by the Government of 
the Sudan and diversifying foreign investment in non-oil sectors led to 
other industries taking off, and the emergence of domestic investment 
and local entrepreneurs. 
4.1  Chinese engagement in the Sudan 
Poverty has been a consistent challenge for the Sudan. Its per 
capita GDP was $38 in 1997, when CNPC started its oil investment in the 
country. Physical infrastructure is generally inadequate. Institutions are 
among the most diverse due to the geographical, ethnical and political 
division among its population. At the same time, the country is among 
the wealthiest in terms of natural resources, not only oil, but also 
minerals, water and agricultural land. It has substantial potential for 
rapid infrastructure, industrial and service development. This provides 
enormous business opportunities for local firms and TNCs. FDI in the 
Sudan’s oil industry can be traced back several decades; oil majors like 
Chevron explored for hydrocarbons but eventually gave up due to the 
civil war and the failure to meet the demand from the host Government 
to speed up oil extraction. 
China’s engagement in the Sudan started as early as the 1970s, 
mainly providing aid and loans for non-commercial purposes. China 
provided a total of $89.3 million in aid and loans to the Sudan in the 
1970s and 1980s (Ministry of Finance, Sudan, 2008), when the Chinese 
economy was still relatively poor. The bilateral relation was cooler during 
the 1980s when China’s top leadership shifted its policy to focusing on 
domestic development. In the early 1990s, it was the Government of 
the Sudan that initiated a renewal of the relationship with China, which 
led to a close commercial tie between the two countries. While FDI 
by Chinese firms (excluding oil investment) between 2000 and March 
2008 was $249 million (table 1), bilateral trade between the Sudan and 
 Transnational Corporations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 2010) 57
China rose from $103 million in 1990 to $9.7 billion in 2007 (Central 
Bank of Sudan, 2008, 2010). The accumulated aid and loans amounted 
to $23,47 billion by 2006 (Sudanese Ministry of Finance, 2008). In 2010, 
China was the Sudan’s largest trading partner while the Sudan was 
China’s third largest trading partner in Africa, after Angola and South 
Africa. The first delegation invited by the Government of the Sudan 
to explore investment opportunities visited the Sudan in 1995. This 
visit included a tour of the Zhong Yuan Oilfield, later developed by an 
affiliate of CNPC. 
Table 1. Chinese direct investment in the Sudan (Non-oil Part)
Year Projects (employees)
Amount
(US$) Industries
2000 5 38,440,451 Petrochemical service station, Roads and Bridges (2), Computer Assembly, Bricks
2001 1 200,000 Leather products
2002 2 1,531,800 Furniture, plastic products
2003 3 12,071,850 Leather products, furniture, lighting bulb
2004 8 (414) 10,889,933
Plastic products (2), leather products, garment, 
food (2), oxygen supply, building material 
manufacture (2)
2005 12 (828) 46,376,952
Steel Manufacture, building material manufacture 
(2), plastic products (2), poultry and vegetables, 
earth moving, restaurant, roads and bridges (3), 
construction equipment
2006 17 (1141) 97,178,745
Transportation (3), advertisement, soil analysis, 
construction (2), irrigation, plastic products (3), 
construction equipment, 
medical equipment, mining, computer equipment, 
furniture, car component manufacturing and 
engineering
2007 22 (1615) 33,574,420
Car service (4), constructions(2), transportation, 
hotel, media and advertisement, farms (2), 
poultry products, engineering workshop (2), 
steel, plastic products (3), mining (2), cement, 
garment 
Mar-08 4 (386) 8,530,039
irrigation, agricultural products, miscellaneous 
(flooring and blankets), 
Plastic Products
2000- 
Mar2008 74 248,794,190
Source:  Ministry of Investment, Sudan (2008). Interpreted from Arabian language and then categorized 
by the author with assistance of her colleague.
Notes:  (1) Data for China’s investment in oil and petrochemical are not shown in this table. They are 
highly confidential and managed by Ministry of Energy and Mining, the Sudan. (2) Employee 
numbers were not available until 2004. 
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4.2  CNPC invests in the Sudan: capability, 
strategy and mindset
CNPC is China’s largest producer and supplier of crude oil and 
natural gas, accounting for, respectively, 57% and 80% of China’s total 
output in 2010. It is also a major producer and supplier of refined oil 
products and petrochemicals, second only to Sinopec. CNPC started its 
foreign expansion in 1993 but made no significant progress until 1997, 
when it acquired large stakes in Kazakhstan, Peru and the Sudan. By 
2010, CNPC had about 80 overseas projects in 29 countries. It is now 
ranked sixth among the world’s largest petroleum companies. 
CNPC’s capability is closely related to its dominant position in 
China’s oil and gas industry, inherited from two major restructurings 
within China’s oil and petrochemical industries. Before the 1980s, 
China’s entire oil and gas exploration and production was controlled by 
the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. In 1988, the State Council dissolved 
this ministry and established CNPC to take control of its assets. The 
assets CNPC owned then were mainly upstream, as Sinopec was to 
control the downstream assets. This arrangement continued until 
1998, when both companies were allocated assets covering upstream 
and downstream. 
With over 50 years’ operation, CNPC possesses unique, advanced 
petroleum technologies5, which supported the development of the 
Chinese petroleum industry as well as its overseas projects. In the Sudan, 
for example, by using technologies developed in China for passive rift 
basins and under-explored basins, CNPC made a discovery of five billion 
barrels of oil in Block 3/7 of the Melut Basin, a basin abandoned by 
western companies (chief executive of CNPC Nile Ltd interviewed on 21 
April 2008, Khartoum). 
Another important capability which assisted CNPC to win 
contracts was its ability to provide products and services at a lower 
5  For instance, the non-marine petroleum geological technology put an end to the 
“China is poor in oil” argument and led to discoveries of large oil fields within China. 
The application of large heterogeneous sandstone reservoir development technology, 
separate zone production, water-cut control, and tertiary recovery technologies stabilized 
the production of the Daqing oilfield at around 50 million tons per year for 27 consecutive 
years, a record for the world petroleum industry. CNPC also owns technologies for the 
commercial development of small fault-block reservoirs (Zhou, 2006).
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price or in difficult circumstances, even in underdeveloped and military-
conflict countries like the Sudan. The lower price was based on cost 
advantages, with costs a third less than the Western bidders in some 
cases. This was particularly attractive for developing host countries 
with “too little money for too many unfulfilled projects” (anonymous 
Sudanese interviewee, 24 April 2008). 
While TNCs are often accused of lacking the mindset to serve the 
poor (Prahalad, 2010), CNPC has many reasons to locate in the poor 
and serve the poor, as evidenced by examples such as establishing the 
refinery and petrochemical industries so as to allow the host country to 
climb up to the oil industry value chain. 
This was influenced by its strategic intent of internationalization 
(Rui and Yip, 2008). As the investment in the Sudan was initiated by the 
two Governments, CNPC was therefore expected to be locally responsive 
in order to maintain the close relation between the two countries. At 
the same time, when resource nationalism makes global competition 
for oil reserves more intense, CNPC has to grasp any opportunity to 
increase its oil reserves and equip itself with international standards 
of technology, health and safety and corporate social responsibility in 
order to win international contracts. 
On 29 November 1996, the four partners from Canada, China, 
Malaysia and the Sudan signed with the Government of the Sudan on a 
draft production sharing agreement for the exploration and development 
of Block 1/2/4 oilfield. In 1997, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating 
Company (GNPOC) was established as a consortium, formed by CNPC, 
Petronas, Talisman Energy which sold its share to the Indian State-owned 
company - Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) - in 2003, 
and Sudapet (representative of the host Government). Based on the 
shares they held, which was 40%, 30%, 25% and 5% respectively, CNPC 
became the operator of GNPOC. By 2008, CNPC had invested in seven 
projects in the Sudan, including four oil exploration and development 
projects, one pipeline, one refinery, and one petrochemical project, 
worth an estimated $5 billion (official at the Ministry of Energy and 
Mining, interviewed on 5 May 2008, Khartoum). 
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4.3  CNPC’s investment in the Sudan: direct and 
indirect impacts 
Direct impacts
The direct impacts that CNPC’s investment has made on the Sudan 
are best represented by the huge revenue the country has received. 
The first barrel of oil was produced and exported from the Sudan in 
1999. The Sudan’s revenue rose substantially year by year between 
2002 and 2008 with the increasing oil output and price (table 2). Our 
follow-up interviews in May 2010 regarding the declining global oil 
price and its impact revealed interesting facts. The Sudan was impacted 
relatively little by the fall in oil price after 2008, because its oil exports 
were managed under long-term contracts in which the price paid for 
oil export from the Sudan gradually increased irrespective of the world 
market price, ensuring the stability of oil income. 
 Compared with the financial crisis, the presidential election in 
2010 was perceived to have far more negative impacts on the Sudan’s 
economy in 2009 and 2010, as reflected in the data for year 2009 
in table 2. Given the unpredictable result of the election, business 
activities including FDI “almost came to a standstill” before and during 
the elections (Sudanese entrepreneur interviewed on 29 May 2010).
Another direct impact is the employment and training provided 
for locals. Employment localization and training have been kept as 
a central issue and paid particular attention during more than 10 
years of CNPC’s operation in the Sudan. Three major reasons can be 
identified. One is that with growing experience of dealing with TNCs, 
the Government of the Sudan has become much stricter in requiring 
TNCs to use local human resources. The previously relaxed terms and 
conditions regarding employment in FDI contracts have changed to the 
current explicit requirement of at least 50% – in some cases as high as 
95% – for local employees (Sudanese interviewee who participated in 
the negotiation in 1996 with CNPC, 5 May 2008). Another reason is that 
CNPC understands the importance of meeting such demands for its 
long-term success in the Sudan as well as in other countries. Finally, the 
resulting cost advantage will be important as China’s own labour costs 
increase. Table 3 presents CNPC’s employee localization, showing an 
average of 73% in GNPOC, the CNPC-led Consortium, by 2008 based on 
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the CNPC source. Our follow-up interview in May 2010 with a Sudanese 
entrepreneur, who was familiar with the overall “Sudanization plan” 
designed by the Government of the Sudan, provided the following 
data: by May 2010, the Sudanization ratio (percentage of the Sudanese 
in the total employees) was 93% in GNPOC, 90% in PDOC, 85% in Block 
6, and 84% in Petronas-run WNPOC 84%6. This is consistent with the 
figures provided by CNPC. Interestingly, we discovered that lower 
skilled jobs in GNPOC had a lower level of localization, compared 
with higher skilled jobs. This result matches the findings at other 
Chinese firms in the Sudan, which all complained that applicants 
for lower-level jobs were more difficult to find, due to the lack 
of experience and communication skills of local people, many of 
whom are unable to speak English.
Three styles of training have been provided in CNPC for local 
employees: on-site training, training in CNPC’s headquarters in Beijing 
6  WNPOC is managed by Petronas and there are no Chinese employees in this 
company. So this figure refers to the fact that the Sudanese account for 84% of the total 
employees and the Malaysians account for 16%.
Table 2.  The Sudan economy in figures 2002-2009
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Population (Million ) 32.7 33.6 34.5 35.4 36.3 37.2 39.2 40.3
GDP Per Capital (US$) 474 572 619 703 831 1247 1480 1356
Inflation % 8.3 7.7 8.5 8.5 7.2 8.1 14.3 11.2
Growth Rate of GDP 
(%, in current prices) 6.5 6.1 9.1 8.3 9.3 10.2 6.8 4.5
Exports ( FOB ) (US$ million) 1949 2542 3777 4824 5656 8902 12480 7834
Imports ( FOB ) (US$ million) 2152 2536 3586 5946 7104 7722 9097 8528
Agricultural Sector 
Contribution to GDP % 46.0 45.6 39.2 26.6 39.2 28.9 31.0 31.2
Industrial Sector Contribution 
to GDP % 23.1 24.1 28.0 33.3 28.3 33 31.4 23.8
Services Sector Contribution 
to GDP % 30.9 30.2 32.8 40.2 32.5 38.1 37.6 45
Governmental Revenue 
(US$ million) (2)* 2991 2814 4095 4873 6030 9578 12635 8504‡ 
Southern Sudan Net Oil 
Revenue Shares 
(US$ million)
814 1216 1662 2938 1060‡
Sources:  Central Bank of Sudan, 2008, May 2010.
Notes:    * Converted from Sudanese Dinar (SDD) at US$1= 250 SDD; ‡ Estimates. 
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and overseas investment sites, and selecting those with potential to 
study in China and return to work in the Sudan. For example, since 
1998, CNPC has spent $1.5 million to enable 35 Sudanese students 
to study and obtain degrees in Petroleum at the University at Beijing 
(CNPC, 2008, pp. 4–5). 
Indirect impacts
The indirect impacts of CNPC’s investment in the Sudan are 
best represented by its linkage effect. FDI in oil is often criticized for 
contributing little to development due to limited linkage opportunities. 
Because of the large volume of investment involved and the relatively 
low transportation costs of the end products, oil majors have been 
reluctant to establish petrochemical plants in developing countries 
(Oman and Chesnais, 1989). It has been difficult to encourage oil TNCs 
to develop downstream activities where and when it is in the host 
country’s long-term economic interests. In this regard, CNPC’s impact 
Table 3.  CNPC’s employment localization in the Sudan 
Name Chinese Sudanese Localization (% of Sudanese to total)
CNPC as operator 73 (average % as operator)
1 Block 1/2/4 32 1200 93*
2 Block 3/7 52 902 88
3 Block 6 88 286 66
4 Block 15 8 25 63
5 Block 13 ** 8 14 45
6 Khartoum Refinery Corporate 375 795 68
7 Khartoum Petrochemicals 34 189 59
8 Petrochemical Trading 4 131 97
CNPC’s subsidiaries as contractors ** 59 (average % as sub contractors)
1 Oriental Exploration 145 1453 91
2 Pipeline Administration 321 96 23
3 Engineering Construction 1515 282 16
4 Greatwall Drilling 745 1263 63
5 Logging Corporate 145 412 74
6 Liao He Oil Exploration 56 274 83
Total average 66
Sources:  CNPC, 2008; A Sudanese interviewee, May 2010. 
Notes:    * Data in 2008 and again in May 2010. ** Data by Feb 2008. 
 Transnational Corporations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 2010) 63
on the Sudan’s economy arises not only from its oil exploitation, but 
also from its petrochemical business. 
As early as in March 1997, CNCP and the Government of the 
Sudan officially signed the general agreement on jointly investing 
and constructing Khartoum Refinery Co. Ltd (KRC) with each party 
holding a 50% share. KRC began its operation in 2000 with a refinery 
capacity of 2.5 million tons, which was expanded to 5 million tons by 
2006. The refinery was entirely designed and constructed by Chinese 
firms, with key equipment brought from China, France and Germany. 
CNPC acquired international technology to deal with wasted oil at this 
refinery to meet the environmental standard set by the host country 
as well as the international standard. Its production capacity can meet 
demand of not only the entire Sudan, but also a small amount of 
export. Petrol stations in Khartoum are run by a wide range of global 
companies including Shell, Petronas and CNPC, offering much lower 
prices than the global market. According to the Agreement signed by 
the two sides, CNPC was required to transfer all its technology required 
for the operation of KRC to local enterprises within eight years. To 
meet this requirement, training for local employees was provided in 
the Sudan and China. A Chinese executive admitted that this was a 
difficult task, and was concerned about the safety of the refinery after 
the transfer. According to this executive, the problem was due to the 
country not having experienced industrialization and to the lack of 
public understanding of factory disciplines. 
Petrochemicals are considered an important downstream 
business of the oil industry, and key to providing inputs for diverse 
industries, leading to development of manufacturing. CNPC helped 
establish Khartoum Petrochemical Ltd, alongside the refinery. At the 
peak time, 340 employees worked at the factory, of which 89 were 
Chinese, 35 Bangladeshi, and 216 local. One Sudanese employee stated 
that he resigned from his previous primary school teacher position to 
work in this factory because of the higher salary. He was paid $300 per 
month given his site manager role, while his Bangladeshi colleague was 
paid $250 per month and drivers $800–900 per month. Although still 
small (52 tons/day) this factory is already able to meet the domestic 
demand for woven sacks. The executive revealed that the factory would 
soon be expanded in order to develop ethylene products, another 
highly demanded business in the Sudan, 
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There are other linkage effects, too. With the increased 
development of the oil and petrochemical industry in the country, 
domestic firms have grown and played complementary roles. The oil 
consortium for Block 17 was led by the Sudanese and the CEO worked 
with GNPOC and is able to operate this new oil consortium. The service 
company Red Corporate, whose CEO was also a Sudanese worked in 
GNPOC, provides project management services to large oil companies, 
previously just in the Sudan but now in other African countries as well. 
This further stimulates the increase of equipment suppliers such as DAL 
Group, the top indigenous private company in the Sudan. 
Interestingly, many highly qualified and experienced Sudanese 
living abroad have returned to the country since 2003 to explore the 
opportunities in the booming domestic economy. Table 4 demonstrates 
the rapid rise in domestic investment from 2000, especially in the 
industrial and service sectors, indicating linkage effects.
4.4  Diversification effort and the cascade effect 
in non-oil industries 
 Previous literature claims that the resource curse could be 
overcome and development would be achieved if the host government 
were able to use the resource income wisely, e.g. establishing oil 
stabilization funds and diversifying FDI to important non-oil industries. 
Table 4 Capital invested by Sudanese and foreign investors 
for the period 2000 – 2009 (Million US$)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
By 
Sudanese 
investors
Industrial 287 696 399 1083 1458 2967 3123 4757 8435 3847
Services 579 931 778 1908 2026 6372 7079 6429 11212 2941
Agricultural 20 25 12 38 36 184 144 108 252 97
Total 886 1652 1189 3029 3520 9523 10346 11293 19897 6885
By 
foreign 
investors*
Industrial 73 426 566 351 348 973 1669 3037 1025 845
Services 229 281 344 275 527 2216 1115 1603 3951 1917
Agricultural 10 3 57 156 4 16 200 381 176 653
Total 312 710 967 782 879 3205 2984 5020 5151 3414
Source:   Ministry of Investment, the Sudan, May 2010.
Notes:   * Capital invested by foreign investors includes those partnerships between foreign and 
domestic investors. 
 Transnational Corporations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 2010) 65
The Government of the Sudan has set up a stabilization fund, the Oil 
Revenues Stabilization Account, which, by late 2008, was among the 50 
largest such funds globally. Meanwhile, during the last decade, a wide 
range of projects have been started or completed by government re-
investment of the oil revenue. Among the Government Development 
Programme between 2000 and 2005, investment in agriculture was 
increased from $6 million to $47 million, in infrastructure from $2.5 
million to $17 million, in social welfare including education and health 
from $1.4 million to $7 million (Ministry of Finance, Sudan, 2008). In 
addition, as the booming economy attracts a new influx of foreign and 
domestic investment, the Government has encouraged investors to 
enter non-oil industries. 
Oil Revenue Stabilization Account
 In oil-rich developing countries, the oil industry is playing 
an increasing role in how a country’s oil and gas is extracted, where 
the revenues go, and how the general public will benefit. An oil fund 
is considered important for managing oil revenues for long-term 
development, as well as for overcoming the “Dutch disease” of rising 
exchange rates that could choke off non-oil industrial development. 
One function of an oil fund is to keep the economy stable by making 
investment expenditures within the economy counter-cyclical. In 
practice, developing countries like the Sudan are expected to keep a 
large proportion of their natural-resource funds in safe foreign 
investments (e.g. US dollar bonds), as it preserves their value and 
avoids the risk of currency appreciation. The econometric estimation 
results from a 30-year panel data set of 15 countries with or without 
an oil fund suggest that oil funds also deliver macro-economic benefits, 
being associated with reduced volatility of broad money and prices and 
lower inflation (Shabsigh and Ilahi, 2007).
The Government of the Sudan set up its Oil Revenue Stabilization 
Account in 2002, with an asset amounting to $24.6 million in 2007, 
$122.4 million in 2009, and an estimated $122.4 million by April 2010 
(IMF, Ministry of Finance of the Sudan, cited in Lim, 2010). There is 
no evidence that the Government of the Sudan has used this account 
for current spending. There has been an international scrutiny on the 
Sudan’s oil revenue and its role in the civil conflict. Setting up such a 
transparent fund would be positive for the country in its effort to attract 
donors (Melby, 2002).
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Investment in infrastructure
 As of 2002, the Sudan had 5,995 km of rail track but more than 
90% of the track was out of use due to civil war damage and lack of 
maintenance. The overall road system was 11,900 km, of which 4,320 
km was paved, in a country of 2.5 million km2. Crucially, there was 
only one major road, the Khartoum-Port Sudan road, which accounted 
for 1,197 km and was completed in 1980. However, the Sudan’s 
infrastructure construction began to speed up since  2002 due not only 
to the rising oil revenue, but also to the availability of international 
investment and loans for which oil export was a precondition. Another 
high quality road between Khartoum and Merowe Dam, stretching 
more than 2,000 km, was completed in 2008. Port Sudan, the sole port 
of the country, has been upgraded. Several power plants have been 
constructed and put in use, leading to a lower frequency of power cut. 
The project of the Merowe Dam on the Nile is a case in point. This is 
the largest hydropower project in Africa. The purpose of the project 
is power generation, water supply for irrigation and flood control. By 
2005 in Sudan, the power generation capacity of only 600 MW was 
available for about 35 million people, which was less than 20 Watts per 
person.7 Insufficient funding and the lack of investor interest stalled the 
project for several decades. After 2000, a greatly improved credit rating 
brought an influx of foreign investment. The total investment (including 
spending on migration) was estimated about four billion euros, of 
which a large proportion was funded by foreign investors (table 5). 
7  This is about one fifteenth of their Egyptian neighbours, and less than one 
hundredth of the OECD average.
Table 5.  Major investors in Merowe Dam construction project* 
No. Investor Fund (in millions of US$)
1 Government of the Sudan 575
2 Government of China 520
3 Arab Fund for Economical and Social Development. 250
4 Saudi Fund for Development 200
5 Abu Dhabi Fund for Development 150
6 Kuwaiti Fund for Economical Development 150
7 Sultanate of Oman 106
8 State of Qatar 15
 Total 1966
Source:  Merowe Dam Construction Committee, the Sudan, 2010. 
Note:  *Funding contributors for migrations compensation due to dam construction are not listed. 
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The contracts for the construction of the dam were signed in 2002 and 
2003. The dam’s power generation capacity was 1,250 MW, doubling 
the national capacity. Chinese company Sinohydro was contracted to 
construct the dam while ABB provided power equipment. At its peak, 
this dam construction required 5,000 employees, of which 2,500 were 
local. The dam was completed and started generating electricity in 
2009, significantly easing the country’s longstanding power shortage.
Investment in agriculture
The Sudan is an agricultural country. An internal 2008 report by 
the Government of the Sudan shows that in 2008, agriculture provided 
40% of its GDP, 65% of its employment, and 80% of its non-oil export 
income. Before oil export began in 1999, agricultural export was the 
sole source of foreign exchange. Although rich in land and water, 
the Sudan’s agriculture was underdeveloped due to the civil war as 
well as the lack of capital, equipment, electricity, water supply (with 
no adequate connections to the Nile) and technology to improve 
productivity (Internal document, 2008). The Government has realized 
the importance and huge potential of this sector, stressing “agriculture 
is Sudan’s another oil” and set year 2009 as “Agricultural Year”, 
together with a grand development plan 2007–2010 to attract future 
investment. 
Local companies like Dal Group have suffered from high import 
price for agricultural products which are major inputs of their food and 
soft drink businesses. Dal has said it is extremely keen to cooperate 
with Chinese companies like COFCO to develop agriculture business, 
possibly even a bio fuel business. Chinese TNCs also play an important 
role in the sector by providing agricultural equipment, as seen in Dal’s 
storage. 
Furthermore, farms were set up by Chinese entrepreneurs when 
they realized that there is demand among Chinese workers in the Sudan 
for certain vegetables that are not produced locally. They started to set 
up farms to produce these vegetables. One farm the author visited in 
the suburb of Khartoum was run by a Chinese woman, who came to 
the Sudan as a doctor, but turned herself into a farmer when sensing 
the lack of local supply. She hired about 30 employees in her farm, who 
were all local except for two farm technicians hired from a Chinese 
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agricultural science academy. She hired local employees because of 
“lower cost and constraint by migration rule”, as she was allowed to 
hire two employees only from China. There were two other farms in 
Khartoum run by Chinese when she started five years ago, but by 2008 
there were more than 10 in the region. These farms supply agricultural 
goods to not only Chinese companies but also local markets. 
5.  Discussion and conclusion: development 
implication
5.1  Development implication
Since the Sudan started to export oil in 1999, significant changes 
have taken place in its economy. It has one of the fastest growing 
economies in Africa (second only to Angola, another resource-
rich country now emerging from civil war), with an average annual 
growth rates of more than 9% between 2005 and 2009 (see table 2). 
By regional and even global comparison, this represents exceptional 
economic growth. The Government is making use of the economic 
growth as foundation to promote development, including setting up 
a resource-stabilization fund, diversifying investment to non-resource 
sectors, encouraging domestic investment, installing much improved 
infrastructure including electricity and water supply, ending the decades 
long civil war with the oil revenue sharing agreement, and promoting 
free movement between the south and north of Sudan, which had been 
deeply divided as a result of European colonial intervention long before 
China’s arrival. It can be further demonstrated that these positive 
developments were achieved through the interaction between FDI and 
host institutions.
5.2  How TNCs’ capacity, strategy and mindset fit 
the local needs
Our case study indicates that investment by developing country 
TNCs in another developing country does provide good fit between 
TNCs’ goals, strategy and mindset and development needs of the host 
country, as well as between TNCs and host institutions. We discovered 
that CNPC and the Sudan met each other’s needs for the following 
reasons. 
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(1)  Table 6 shows that since 2003, China has climbed to the third position 
in oil importation and is now close to Japan as the second largest oil 
importer. Chinese imports increased rapidly from 1.9 million barrels 
per day in 2000 to approximately 3.8 million barrels per day in 2006 
(ENI, 2008). The Sudan is able to provide China 8% of its total need 
(Bank of Sudan, 2008). 
(2)  While the Sudan has plenty of oil, it lacked the capital and 
capability to turn the resources into national wealth and long-term 
development. CNPC provided them, enabling oil exploration and a 
successful start of oil exports.
 (3) While the Sudan was under international sanctions and Western 
firms were reluctant to invest in the Sudan, CNPC was willing to 
invest, having taken into account of not only the close relationship 
between the two countries, but also the difficulty of accessing oil 
resources in the global market. This latecomer disadvantage impedes 
CNPC’s global strategy and compels it to pursue investment in areas 
which longer-established TNCs have written off as geologically or 
politically unworkable. 
(4) Concerned about developing country TNCs’ less advanced 
technological and managerial capabilities, the Sudan hires developed 
country TNCs to supervise developing country TNCs. It has concluded 
a production sharing agreement with foreign investors and applies 
international health, safety and environment (HSE) standards to 
achieve both quality and cost efficiency. To avoid poor institutions 
harming its long-term interests in the host country, and with the 
strategic intent to learn international management skills, CNPC is 
willing to work under such supervision as the production sharing 
agreement also sets obligations for host countries, e.g. providing a 
safe investment environment. 
(5)  Given the large amount of investment CNPC has every reason to 
demand good governance to ensure a higher return on its investment. 
To do so, the company does not directly criticize the host institutions 
but persuades the host government to improve by demonstrating 
attractive prospect on FDI’s benefits to the host economy. The host 
government, on the other hand, has realized the “necessary and 
urgent” need to establish formal laws and regulations to benefit 
from FDI (official at Sudanese Ministry of Energy and Mining, 
interviewed in April 2008). For example, the Ministry of Energy 
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and Mining published for the first time an “Investor Manual on 
Energy and Mining Fields” in 2006 to inform and instruct potential 
investors, which also lists detailed information on oil blocks for 
potential investors (table 7 is one example). Furthermore, improving 
efficiency and addressing the problem of corruption have also been 
considered by the host government as necessary for attracting 
potential investors and keeping existing investors in the Sudan. 
Most importantly, understanding that a peaceful environment is 
vital for attracting FDI, the Governments and the rebels in the south 
eventually signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, by 
allowing the south to share 40% of the oil revenue. 
Consequently, the mutual benefits brought not only much 
improvement to the capabilities of both sides but also the better 
understanding and deeper cooperative relationship. CNPC has 
accumulated rich experience in working in a least developed country, 
while the Sudanese gained experience of managing natural resources 
and of ensuring more local benefits from TNCs. 
Table 6 The top ten oil import countries in the world 
(thousand barrels/day)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
United 
States 9710 10428 10945 11084 11716 12120 11805 12562 13482 13947 13841
Japan 5615 5519 5265 5263 5377 5042 5125 5168 5106 5233 5127
China 841 1305 1094 1238 1886 1754 1975 2572 3383 3346 3834
Germany 2995 2997 3082 2889 2917 2977 2825 2851 2884 2946 2934
Rep. of 
Korea 2514 2849 2664 2827 2934 2851 2694 2666 2720 2697 2823
Netherlands 1866 1943 1945 1932 2105 2153 2129 2155 2318 2506 2658
India 1076 1142 1267 1488 1667 1714 1775 1960 2077 2218 2464
France 2152 2179 2309 2227 2308 2281 2243 2320 2353 2426 2355
Singapore 1716 1768 1707 1690 1622 1678 1705 1655 1895 2128 2349
Italy 2166 2189 2266 2162 2210 2145 2165 2188 2164 2179 2137
Top 10 
countries 30651 32319 32544 32801 34742 34715 34438 36096 38381 39626 40522
Rest of the 
World 18202 19159 19530 19321 19925 20516 20715 21259 22771 23202 23706
World 48853 51478 52073 52121 54667 55232 55153 57355 61152 62829 64228
Source:   ENI, 2008. 
 Transnational Corporations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 2010) 71
5.3  The unique role of Chinese TNCs in the 
Sudan’s development
While this paper has provided some insights on the contribution 
of Chinese investors to development in the Sudan, this still leaves open 
the question of whether this is the best alternative for the Sudan. As 
noted above, China has never been the sole investor in the Sudan. 
Before Chinese investors entered the country in the late 1990s, Western 
oil firms had been exploring for oil in the Sudan for decades. Since the 
arrival of Chinese oil firms, TNCs including most of the top oil firms from 
developing countries have been working with the Chinese on projects 
such as GNPOC. As observed by the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID), Chinese investment in the African 
oil sector is growing rapidly, but it is still a small player. The accumulated 
investment by TNCs in Africa is $170 billion, of which China has invested 
just $17 billion (DFID, 2008). It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that other investors could also contribute to promoting Sudanese 
development. Indeed, besides CNPC, there are a large number of global 
and national oil companies investing in the Sudan (table 7).
Data on other relevant investors in the Sudan collected for 
this study enable a comparative view of the Chinese contribution. 
To supplement past comparisons, questions comparing CNPC with 
Western oil firm (mainly Chevron) and other developing country oil firms 
(mainly Patronas and ONGC) were raised with interviewees working 
for the Ministry of Energy and Mining; GNPOC; local firms partnered 
with these firms; and the general public. Data collected indicate that 
Chinese investors have several features which enable them to make a 
unique contribution to the Sudan’s development. 
 First, Chinese investors are more willing to take risk. Here, 
comparison with Chevron is especially revealing. Chevron was granted 
its oil concession in 1974 and discovered oil in 1978. The Shell (Sudan) 
Development Company Limited subsequently took a 25% interest in 
Chevron’s project. Together, the companies spent about $1 billion in 
extensive seismic testing and the drilling of 52 wells (Talisman Energy, 
1998, p. 4.). However, Chevron suspended its operation in the Sudan 
by the end of 1984 and eventually withdrew. According to John Silcox, 
the president of Chevron’s overseas operations at the time, withdrawal 
was made because they did not want to expose their employees 
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to “undue risk” in the middle of a civil war zone.8 The fact that 
Chevron’s employees were attacked several times by the southern 
rebel groups9 was the direct cause of the company’s suspension of 
8  Wall Street Journal, 1 November 1984.
9  Civil war between the southern and northern Sudan started well before 1970s 
when Chevron discovered oil. The Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 that ended the 
first civil war in Sudan provided qualified rights for the autonomous southern regional 
government to receive revenues accruing from mineral and other natural resources in 
the South. At the time of the agreement in 1972, no one was aware of oil deposits in the 
south. After the discovery of oil in 1978, southerners feared that the government, always 
dominated by the northern elite, would deny the south jobs and other benefits. More 
conflicts between the south and north took place (Alier, 1973, p. 244).
Table 7.  An overview of the oil operating companies and their 
shareholders in the Sudan
Operators Shareholders (% of shares in bracket) Block
Greater Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company 
(GNPOC). 
CNPC (40%), Petronas (30%), ONGC (25%) & Sudapet 
(5%)
Blocks 1,2 & 4
Petrodar Petroleum 
Operating Company 
(PDOC). 
CNPC (41%), Petronas (40%), Thani (5%), SINOEC 
(6%) & Sudapet (8%)
Blocks 3 & 7
White Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company 
(WNPOC). 
Petronas (68.875%), ONGC (24.125%) & Sudapet (7%) Block 5A
White Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company 
(WNPOC). 
Petronas (39%), Lundin (24.5%), Sudan CNPC (95%) & 
Sudapet (5%)
Block 5B
Petro-Energy Operating 
Company. 
China National Petroleum Company International, 
Sudan CNPC (95%) & Sudapet (5%)
Block 6
White Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company 
(WNPOC). 
Petronas (77%), Sudapet (15%) and Hi Tech (8%) Block 8
Sudapak Operating 
Company. 
Zaver Petroleum Co. Ltd. (85%) and Sudapet (15%) Block 9,11 & A
Sahara Oil Company. Alqohtani & Sons (33%), ANSAN WIKFS (20%), 
Sudapet (20%)
Block 12A
Coral Petroleum Operating 
Company. 
CNPC red sea, Pertamina, AfricaEnergy, Ecpress oil, 
Sudapet and Dinder Group
Block 13
Salima Oil Company. PetroSA (80%) & Sudapet (20%) Block 14
Red Sea Petroleum 
Operating Company 
(RSPOC). 
CNPC, Petronas, Sudapet, Hi Tech., The Nigerian 
Express Oil
Block 15
International Petroleum 
Company in Sudan Limited 
(IPSL). 
Owned by Lundin (100%) Block 16
Star Oil Company. ANSAN WIKFS (66%) and Sudapet (34%) Block 17
TOTAL Exploration – Sudan. Total Exploration (32.5%), Marathon Petroleum 
(32.5%), Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Co. 
(25%) & Sudapet PC (10%)
Block B
Advanced Petroleum 
Operating Company 
(APCO). 
PanEnergy Oil & Gas (32.5%), Hi Tech (32.5%), 
Sudapet (17%), Khartoum State (10%) and Heglieg 
(8%)
Block C
Source:  Oil Exploration & Production Authority, Ministry of Energy & Mining, the Sudan, 2008.
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operations, but interviewees in the Sudan believed that the low global 
oil price and availability of better quality oil reserves around the world 
in the mid-1980s also played a part in Chevron’s decision. CNPC, on the 
other hand, took the risk of entering the Sudan in 1995 when civil war 
had stopped but conflicts between the south and the north persisted. 
The Chinese deployed a different approach to dealing with the risk, 
including encouraging the peace process and sharing the oil revenue 
between the rebels in the south and the Government. Most Chinese 
interviewees including the Commercial Consul believed that poverty is 
the fundamental cause of the conflicts in the Sudan, and stimulating 
the economic development will contribute to the peace process if a fair 
deal on oil revenue sharing can be reached. 
Second, Chinese TNCs are willing and able to work on low-margin 
projects, which enables the Sudanese to implement more affordable 
projects. Chinese bidders for sub-contracts in the oil and infrastructure 
sectors could offer prices one third lower than their Western and even 
Malaysian and Indian counterparts. This was further supported by the 
lower cost of labour and equipment in China. For example, CNPC’s 
engineers in the Sudan are paid less than one third of the salary of 
their Western counterparts such as Schlumberger and are entitled to 
much fewer holidays. Although Malaysian and Indian TNCs may have 
a wage level as competitive as Chinese TNCs, they do not enjoy the 
great advantage of cheap and reliable supplies of equipment available 
in China. 
Third, CNPC has technology, human resources, equipment and 
efficiency to provide a comprehensive service covering oil exploration, 
refining and petrochemicals, and therefore offer the foundation for 
sustainable development of the Sudanese oil industry. It was noted 
that well before the Chinese entry, the Government of the Sudan 
had a vision to “build up the integrated Sudan Petroleum Industry 
and make the oil industry the engine of Sudan’s economy” (CNPC, 
2006). Such an integrated Sudan Petroleum Industry was envisaged 
to have upstream exploration as well as downstream petrochemical 
production for export via pipeline. CNPC was able to provide all the 
technology and equipment needed to realize this vision. Other TNCs 
in the Sudan including Petronas and ONGC are able to provide most of 
the required technology and equipment, but it is questionable whether 
they would have provided the same technology and equipment at 
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the same price and more importantly, completed the projects within 
the same time frame. CNPC has achieved several world records in the 
oil industry in terms of the speed of construction in the Sudan. The 
company built a 15 million ton oil field in one and a half years. It also 
succeeded in establishing a pipeline totalling 1,500 kilometres in 11 
months and took only two years to set up the Khartoum Refinery with 
a processing capacity of 2.5 million tons of crude oil. The Chinese and 
Sudanese interviewees who participated in the projects attributed 
such speed to China’s centralized and integrated corporate system 
and the Chinese hardworking spirit. While Western TNCs tend to spin 
off non-core businesses and make strategic use of outsourcing, many 
Chinese TNCs still keep an integrated structure with hundreds of 
thousands of employees. CNPC had 1.67 million employees across all 
oil-related businesses by 2009. This structure, which is often viewed by 
organizational analysts as disadvantageous, turns out to be effective in 
mobilizing all the capabilities to complete comprehensive oil projects 
in a short time period. One Sudanese manager in GNPOC compared 
CNPC with Petronas and ONGC. He concluded that efficiency is the 
major difference between the three companies and further elaborated 
that while CNPC was very quick in decision-making, Petronas and 
ONGC would arrive at decisions “slowly” and inevitably “lost many 
opportunities”. It was also revealed that the 1,500 km pipeline project 
was initially contracted to an affiliate of Petronas, but had to allow a 
CNPC unit to take over after failing to meet the deadline set by the 
Government of the Sudan. 
Finally, CNPC as the largest State-owned oil firm in China 
considers itself to have the obligation to maintain good relationship 
with the Sudan and also to protect “China’s image”. At the same time, 
it also enjoys strong support from the Government of China and State-
owned banks. Given these obligation and support, Chinese managers 
are able to use long-term strategy to develop relations with the host 
institutions. Counterparts from the West and Petronas and ONGC 
are more constrained by short-term considerations including profit 
maximization. For example, while CNPC could make a huge financial 
commitment to the Sudan with Government and bank support, Petronas 
and ONGC have less support from their respective Government and 
more constraints from their shareholders. Both companies are investing 
in several oilfields, but none of them could make funding, equipment, 
 Transnational Corporations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 2010) 75
engineering and efficiency commitments to the Sudan comparable to 
CNPC’s. 
5.4  Propositions for future research
Rapid and sustained economic growth is only the first step 
towards development. FDI appears to have played a role in the Sudan’s 
development, but it remains insufficient, with its benefits heavily 
dependent on continued appropriate co-evolution of TNCs and host 
institution strategy.
Further research is needed for a better understanding of the 
development implications in the Sudan, especially of the Government’s 
plans for education, health, for non-oil sectors like agriculture, for oil 
income distribution, and for the institutional environment including tax 
and other FDI policies. Recent events also necessitate an examination 
of the impact of global financial liquidity constraints and the rapid 
oil price decline since mid-2008, even though the current crisis only 
partly contributes to the reduced oil revenue and FDI in the Sudan (as 
shown in tables 2 and 4). The country’s peace was achieved largely 
because the Government agreed to share the oil revenue with the 
south. The negative impact on FDI and the entire economy arising from 
the potential instability at the time of the Sudan’s 2010 presidential 
election indicates that stability is of paramount importance to the 
Sudan’s development. Above all, this is a necessity to improve both FDI 
strategy and the country’s capacity and the institutional environment 
so that the Sudan could not only attract FDI but also maximize the 
benefit of FDI. 
The following propositions are therefore considered important 
for further research:
P1: The Sudan’s development will be adversely affected by the 
impact of global financial liquidity constraints and the rapid oil price 
decline.
P2: The Sudan’s development will take off as long as the country 
successfully channel oil profits to the manufacturing and service sectors, 
and ensure the continuing growth of these sectors.
P3: The Sudan’s development will take off as long as the FDI has 
produced sufficient linkage and spillover effects, while local human 
capital is ready to take use of the opportunities. 
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P4: The Sudan’s development will take off as long as the peace 
can be kept and Darfur issue can be resolved. 
P5: The Sudan’s development will take off as long as FDI works 
hand in hand with host institutions.
This investigation, although taking the Sudan as a detailed case-
study, may provide some development implications for the expansion 
of China’s investment in Africa as a whole. According to the World 
Investment Report 2009 (UNCTAD, 2009, p 42), the number of policy 
measures adopted by several African countries continued to make the 
business environment more conducive to the FDI. The Sudan’s case is 
consistent with this observation. The case of the Sudan may also have 
implications to other developing countries as this is a typical case of 
South-South FDI. Despite some positive effects of the FDI on the 
Sudan’s economy, it is important to emphasize the contextual nature of 
the impacts observed and the limitations of the information available. 
At the same time, the commercial and social impact of Chinese TNCs 
and their role in shaping more inclusive local policies stand in contrast 
to the generally negative portrayal of China’s political involvement 
in the Sudan. There are identifiable links between Chinese-led oil 
development and the move towards resolving the internal conflicts.
In addition to facilitating understanding of Chinese involvement 
in Africa, this paper may also make some theoretical contributions 
to international business research on the development implication 
of developing country FDI. It demonstrates that developing country 
FDI can make positive contributions to development particularly 
in developing countries, due not only to its capacity appropriate for 
developing countries, but also to its strategies and mindset more 
adaptable to the development needs and institutional environment 
in the host country. While current researches often emphasize how 
institutions make FDI’s impact on host country differ (e.g. Boudier-
Bensebaa, 2008) and how institutions in developing countries should be 
improved in order to attract FDI,10 this research indicates that TNCs’ 
proactive adaptation of strategy to fit local needs and institutions 
may be more effective for improving institutors and consequently 
the development in host countries.
10  e.g. the argument of “governance matters” (Hout, 2010).
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